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SPECIAL SECTION
MODELS AND LEGAL POLICY
MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND
LEGAL REALITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE POISSON MODEL
OF JURY BEHAVIOR
by David Kaye*
Mathematical models are great fun. With them, we can trace the
development of the large-scale features of the universe,' the struggles
of predator and prey,2 the evolution of the sun and other stars, 3 and
the path of the world economy into the year 2000. 4 Indeed, the range
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University, S.B. 1968, M.I.T.; A.M. 1969, Harvard
University; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School. This work was supported by the Arizona State
University Faculty Grant-In-Aid Program and the Cleary Research Fellowship Fund.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Dennis Young, Dennis Karjala, and
Alan Gelfand in the development of this article.
1. E.g., Barrow & Silk, The Structure of the Early Universe, SCIENTIFIC A.SL, April
1980, at 118; Norman & Silk, On the Formation and Evolution of Clumps of Galaxies in
an Expanding Universe, 224 ASTROPHYSICAL J. 293 (1978).
2. E.g., Tanner, The Stability and tire Intrinsic Growth Rates of Prey and Predator
Populations, 56 ECOLOGY 855 (1975). Cf. Hirsch & Nasell, The Transmission and Con-
trol of Schistosome Infections, in MATHEATICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISION PROBLEMS
IN ECOLOGY 271 (A. Charnes & W. Lynn eds. 1975) (modeling parasite endemicity).
3. E.g., D. CLAYTON, PRINCIPLES OF STELLAR EVOLUTION AND NUCLEOSY.N'THESIS
(1968).
4. Leontief, The World Economy of the Year 2000, SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 1930, at
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of phenomena that might be modeled seems bounded only by imagi-
nation and ingenuity. However, if little is known about the reality
that the model is intended to simulate, even the most mathematically
elegant model may not be very useful in practice. As Michael
Finkelstein, perhaps the preeminent advocate of quantitative models
in law, has cautioned:
A mathematical model cannot reflect all the elements of re-
ality and need not do so to produce usable estimates. How-
ever, modeling involves drastic simplifications, and care is
needed to avoid conclusions that are wide of the mark. In
particular, there is a tendency-which must be scrutinized
in each case-to sweep away complexity to permit mathe-
matical accessibility. This drive for quantification sometimes
tempts the mathematician to ignore or reject complicating
factors that are nonetheless essential to the legal picture.
The lawyer may be an unwitting accomplice in this process
if he limits his role to a passive understanding of his expert's
work, and fails to pursue a critical evaluation from a care-
fully focused legal point of view. The records of judicial and
administrative proceedings are already strewn with the dis-
asters that this uncritical acceptance sometimes allows.5
I wish to underscore and illuminate this warning by considering
in more detail than Finkelstein has done6 a mathematical model that
seems to be in vogue among mathematicians, 7 economists, 8 and polit-
ical scientists9 interested in jury decisionmaking. This model began
5. M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 11-12 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
6. Id. at 11 n.27.
7. Gelfand & Solomon, Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models: An Argu-
ment in Favor of the Twelve Member Jury, 17 JuRIMETRICS J. 292 (1977); Gelfand &
Solomon, An Argument in Favor of 12-Member Juries, in MODELING THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 205 (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Gelfand & Solomon, Rejoinder, 72 J. AM.
STATISTICAL A. 536 (1977); Gelfand & Solomon, Analyzing the Decision Making Proc-
ess of the American Jury, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 305 (1975); Gelfand & Solomon,
Modeling Jury Verdicts in the American Legal System, 69 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 32
(1974); Gelfand & Solomon, A Study of Poisson's Model for Jury Verdicts in Criminal
and Civil Cases, 68 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 271 (1973).
8. Klevorick & Rothschild, A Model of the Jury Decision Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
141, 150 (1979).
9. Grofman, Jury Decision-Making Models, in MODELING THE CIUMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 191, 196 (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Grofman, Not Necessarily Twelve and Not Neces-
sarily Unanimous, in PSYCHOLOGY AJD THE LAW (G. Bermont & N. Vidmur eds. 1976).
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with the renowned mathematician Simeon Poisson. With it, Poisson
calculated that in his day 47% of the criminally accused in France
were not guilty and that the individual jurors erred in one-third of
their verdicts.' 0 In more recent years, Poisson's model has been ably
refined and extended, principally by Celfand and Solomon, who have
employed it with data from the 1950's on jury verdicts in the United
States." Among other things, Gelfand and Solomon purport to show
(with varying degrees of confidence) that the probable (apparent) guilt
of an accused brought before a jury in this country is between .66
and .76, that there is "essentially no difference" in the probability of
conviction by a six- as opposed to a twelve-person jury, and that the
probabilities of both false convictions and false acquittals are substan-
tially greater with the smaller jury. Conclusions such as these are of
obvious interest in connection with the issue of the constitutionality
of departures from the traditional twelve-member jury, and Gelfand
and Solomon conclude that their "fairly sophisticated probabilistic
models"'12 undermine cases like Williams v. Florida.'3
As I have intimated, I believe that at least some of these deduc-
tions and predictions are not warranted by the current jury models,
especially as used with existing empirical data on jury decisions. I fo-
cus on the Poisson model as refined by Gelfand and Solomon because
I believe it to be the most powerful and defensible model thus far
constructed.' 4 Part I reviews the Poisson model in order to enucleate
its many assumptions. Although a number of mathematical equations
appear in this section, the analysis should be accessible to readers
whose mathematical expertise is limited to high school algebra. Part
II is directed to more mathematically inclined readers. It explains
10. S. PoISSON, RECHERCHES, SUR LA PROBABILrig DES JUGEMENTS EN MATIkRE
CRIMINELLE ET EN MATItRE CvivLE 373 (1837).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 311.
13. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). A careful and very helpful discussion of the relationship be-
tween social science research and the constitutional issue is provided in Lempert, Un-
covering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73
MicEL L. REv. 643 (1975). The Court's most recent decisions on the constitutionality of
smaller juries are Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979). These rulings, and the role of statistical reasoning in resolving the jury
size question are discussed in Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: The Supreme Court,
Statistical Reasoning, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CAmF. L. REv. 1004 (1980).
14. Most contemporary models are discussed in Penrod & Hastie, Models of Jury
Decision Making: A Critical Review, 86 PsYcE. BULL. 462 (1979). For a more detailed
criticism of the models cited in Ballew v. Georgia (and a less elaborate analysis of the
Poisson model than is presented here), see Kaye, supra note 13.
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why these assumptions may introduce serious errors into the proba-
bilities calculated according to the model. To emphasize the difficul-
ties involved, it also exhibits a model that is more plausible but quite
intractable. Part III indicates one reason that even a relatively error-
free model would have limited usefulness in resolving the constitu-
tional issue posed by juries composed of fewer than twelve persons.
I. TimE POISSON MODEL AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS
To appreciate the Poisson model and its limitations, it is helpful
to see how it is derived. An understanding of the essential features of
the model requires more patience than mathematical acumen. Al-
though the derivation of the equations is not mathematically complex,
there are many symbols to keep track of.
A. Notation
To start with, the mathematics can be illustrated most easily by
considering the simplest possible cases-a one-member "jury" and a
two-member panel. The probability that a one-member "jury" will
convict in a randomly selected case can be called Pc. This probability
of conviction can be written, as we will soon see, in terms of two pa-
rameters: the probability A that the decision will be correct and the
probability 0 that the defendant is legally guilty.15 To express Pc in
terms of g and 0, some further notation is helpful. Let G represent
the event that the defendant is guilty, and let G designate the com-
plementary event that he is not guilty. The probabilities associated
with these events are P0 and Pd, respectively. Similarly, we can de-
note the probabilities of conviction and non-conviction as Pc and P o:.
Of course, the probability of a jury conviction does not necessa-
rily equal the probability of a defendant's guilt. Some of the guilty es-
cape punishment, and some of the innocent are convicted. To ac-
count for such unpleasant possibilities, we let PCIG stand for the
probability that a juror votes to convict given that defendant is actu-
ally guilty, and we take Pcld to be the probability of a vote for convic-
15. On the meaning of legal and factual guilt, see Aranella, Reforming the Federal
Grand Jury and the State Preliminarj Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudica-
tion, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 463, 465-66 n.6 (1980). Gelfand and Solomon prefer to define 0
as the probability that a defendant is very likely to be guilty given the evidence ad-
duced, i.e., that a defendant is "convictable" rather than "truly guilty." Nevertheless, in-
terpreting 0 as the proportion of defendants who are actually guilty is equally compati-
ble with the equations used in the model. That there is no practical method to verify
the value of 0 deduced from the model does not preclude this interpretation of 0. See
Kaye, supra note 13, at 410-11 n.43.
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tion given that defendant is not guilty. In an ideal world, one in
which all the guilty were convicted and none of the innocent were
convicted, PcIa would equal one, and Pcd would equal zero.
Another way to express the likelihood of false convictions is to
define Pc as the probability, before trial, that a randomly selected
defendant is guilty and that the jury convicts. Likewise, Pcd is the
probability of a conviction and an innocent defendant. Whereas the
previous formulation pertained to the conditional probabilities (of
conviction given guilt and of conviction given innocence), the proba-
bilities PcG and Pcd are unconditional. They pertain to events occur-
ring jointly. To illustrate this distinction, consider the events "a
cloudy day" and "a rainy day." Suppose we are asked to estimate the
conditional probability that tomorrow will be rainy given that tomor-
row is cloudy. Knowing that it will be cloudy, we might pick a fairly
high value for this probability. On the other hand, our estimate of
the probability that it will be both cloudy and rainy may be lower,
since we are not assured that tomorrow will be cloudy.
The joint probabilities and the conditional probabilities are
closely intertwined, however. By the definition of conditional proba-
bility,
PcG = PCIGPG (la)
and
Pcd = Pct pe (1b)
Put otherwise, (la) states that the probability that defendant is not
only guilty, but also convicted, is simply the probability that he is
convicted given that he is guilty times the probability that he is
guilty. Equation (ib) states in an analogous way the probability that
defendant is not guilty but convicted. So much for notation.
B. First Ballot Probabilities
Let us consider the one-person "jury." The probability Pc that
the "juror" will convict can be written as the sum of two terms: (1)
the probability that he will convict and that the defendant is guilty,
and (2) the probability that he will convict and that the defendant is
not guilty. In symbols,
Pc = PCG + PC (2)
The first term on the right is an "error free" term, while the second




Pc PCIGPG + PCIOPO (3)
Now C/G is a correct decision, and C/C is an incorrect one.
Since, by definition, g is the probability of a correct decision, we can
substitute PcIG = g and Pcid = 1- g into (3) to obtain
PC = PG11 + P (1- A) (4)
But PG is the same as 0, the probability before trial of guilt, so
PC = 0/1 + (I - 0 (I - At) (5)
Equation (5) expresses Pc in terms of 0 and ft, as promised, but
is otherwise uninteresting. The two-person jury case is more re-
vealing. Let 72,A represent the probability that exactly i jurors in the
two-member panel will vote for acquittal on the first ballot. The
probability that both jurors will vote to convict is thus 72,0. By an ex-
tension of the reasoning that led to (5), it follows that
72,0 = Og2 + (1-6)(1-.t)2  (6)
The "error-free" term now contains a factor /.2 instead of 1., reflecting
the probability that two jurors, rather than one, vote correctly to con-
vict. Likewise, the (1-/1)2 in the "error" portion of (6) reflects the
possibility that both votes for conviction are incorrectly cast. 16
The probability that the two-member jury will split is
72,1 = 011 (1-ft) + (l-O)pA (i-.) (7)
16. The full derivation of (6) requires additional notation. Let CIC2 denote the joint
event that both juror number one and juror number two vote to convict on the first bal-
lot. Then the probability associated with this event can be written
72.0 = PrPCIC,2, + POPCC210
Assuming that each juror votes independently,
72.0 = PGPC,PCfG + PdPcadPc,,4
If each juror is equally likely to vote correctly, so that Pcaa = Pcg = 1A and Pcao - Pcfo
= i-p, we have
72.0 = PG + Pe(1-l)'
Finally, identifying 0 with PG and 1-0 with Pd, we arrive at (6).
The Poisson model differs from a more simplistic "one parameter" model in which
each juror has the same probability of voting to convict, and this probability is Inde-
pendent of whether defendant is guilty. The probability of a vote to convict In the
Poisson model depends on whether defendant is guilty. If there is guilt, the conditional
probability is p.; otherwise, it is 1-p- One consequence of this difference Is that al-
though a one parameter model requires that y,.0 = 7-,o, the more flexible Poisson model
does not.
[Vol, 13:1
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Here the "error-free" and the "error" term alike involve the probabil-
ity of one correct vote, /4 and the probability of one incorrect vote,
The remaining possibility is that both jurors vote to acquit on the
first ballot. The probability of this event is given by
y2=2 = (1-/L) 2 + (1- p. 2  (8)
The values of 0 and can now be deduced-provided that we
have measurements of the way two-member juries divide on their
first ballot votes in a representative cross-section of cases. Thinking of
the observed data on the ballot distributions of two-member juries as
having been generated according to the probability model (6-8), we
can ask what specific values of 0 and / would be the most likely to
produce the observed sample of juror votes. The values deduced in
this fashion are known as maximum likelihood estimates.
1 7
The generalization of this procedure to deal wvith larger juries is
mathematically straightforward. Without belaboring the details any
further, it turns out that for a jury of size n, the probability -,.i of i
initial votes for acquittal can be written18
Yni= + (J_@,,!(1-p))*-] (9)
Using data on the first ballot voting patterns of the twelve-member
juries studied by Kalven and Zeisel, Gelfand and Solomon find the
maximum likelihood estimators of 0 and g to be .69 and .88, respec-
tively.
C. Final Verdict Probabilities
To arrive at the probability Pc that a jury will convict on the final
ballot, we must relate the initial votes, whose probabilities -y', we
17. Other methods of deducing the values of the parameters 0 and I are also used by
Gelfand and Solomon. I mention maximum likelihood estimation because it is intui-
tively accessible and appealing. To take a simpler example, suppose we know that a
coin has been flipped 10 times and has come up heads nine times. What is the probabil-
ity -r that this coin will come up heads on any given toss? The maximum likelihood esti-
mator for -r is simply the observed proportion of heads, fi =.9. The likelihood that a coin
will show 9 out of 10 heads is greatest if that coin is weighted so that in each toss the
chance of a head is .9.
Of course, -r might not be .9. If our prior experience with coins led us to expect that
the coin would be balanced, then we might choose a number closer to .5 for our esti-
mate ofi.The formalprocedure forincorporatingprior experience into parameteresti-
mation is known as Bayesian estimation.
18. The expression (,I is the binomial coefficient that gives the number of distinct
ways n objects can be selected i at a time.
19801
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know from (9), to the final votes. Gelfand and Solomon use data on
both mock and actual twelve-member juries to calculate the probabil-
ity Pc,12 ,i that a jury of size twelve that starts out with i votes for ac-
quittal ultimately will convict. The probability of conviction is then
given by
Pc -: Pc1l2,0Y12,0 + Pc112,1Y 12,1 + + Pc, 1 2 ,12y 12, 12  (10)
To make predictions about other sized juries, Gelfand and Solo-
mon use the analogous relation
Pc = Pcn,noyn,o + + Pcln,rp.n,n (11)
where n is, of course, the jury size in question. They assume that the
transition probabilities PcI12J found from data on unanimous twelve-
member juries hold, mutatis mutandis, for nonunanimous juries and
for smaller juries. For example, they assume that the probability that
a six-member jury will convict if it starts out with one vote for acquit-
tal is the same as the probability that a twelve-member jury will con-
vict if it begins with two votes for acquittal. 19 In other words,
Gelfand and Solomon calculate the transition probabilities on the ba-
sis of a "proportionality hypothesis" that states
PCI.,ni 12 = PCI12. (12)
Having estimated the probability of conviction for various sized
juries, Gelfand and Solomon find the conditional probabilities of false
convictions and false acquittals by various applications of the defini-
tion of conditional probability and its close cousin, Bayes's rule.
D. Scrutinizing the Assumptions
The mathematical manipulations outlined above are mathematic-
ally impeccable. Since Gelfand and Solomon (not to mention Poisson)
are deservedly respected mathematicians, this is hardly surprising. If
the model has any weakness, it must lie in the plausibility and appro-
priateness of the assumptions built into it. Many of these assumptions
are carefully stated by Gelfand and Solomon, but evaluating their sig-
nificance is another matter. In this section, I shall argue that the as-
sumptions are so drastically simplified that the numerical predictions
of the model must be approached with the greatest caution.
To begin with, let us consider the meaning of 0 in more detail.
19. See Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 310.
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This parameter, as we have seen, is the probability before trial that a
defendant is guilty.20 Although 0 undoubtedly varies from case to
case, it is assumed to be the same for all defendants. In principle B
could be allowed to take on different values for various types of de-
fendants or offenses, but current data is too limited to permit this.
21
In addition, 0 is assumed to be independent of n. At first blush,
this supposition seems plausible, but it ignores a conceivable feed-
back effect of the jury size n on 0. Some writers have speculated that
smaller juries are more prone to convict an innocent defendant but
less likely to fail to convict a guilty person than larger juries.22 Cer-
tainly, some plaintiffs' attorneys believe that it is easier to convince
six jurors than to prevail before the traditional panel of twelve.
2 3
Moreover, much of the commentary on the Supreme Court's jury
size decisions argues that the decisions of smaller juries are likely to
be more erratic than those of larger bodies.24 If many prosecutors
share the view that smaller juries are more prone to err, especially
by way of conviction, then these prosecutors might be wvilling to pro-
ceed with less compelling evidence, and a lower value of 0 might
come to characterize a regime of smaller juries.
The second parameter A is the probability that a juror will vote
correctly on the first ballot. Although x plainly varies from juror to
juror and from case to case, it, too, is taken to be constant. 25 Moreo-
ver, there is a possible feedback effect betveen 1i and 0. If 0 is ap-
proximately one as opposed to, say, one-half jurors may be more in-
clined to reason that "the defendant is guilty, or else he wouldn't be
20. See note 15 supra.
21. Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 300; Model-
ing Jury Verdicts in the American Legal System, supra note 7; A Study of Poisson's
Model, supra note 7.
22. Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convictions, Jury Size and Type I and
Type 1I Errors, 26 AM. STATISTICrAN 21 (1972); Lempert, supra note 3; Nagel & Neef,
Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum jury Size and Fraction Required to
Convict, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933.
23. ROSCOE POUND--AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, A,%NNUAL CIUEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 20 (1977).
24. E.g., Kaye, supra note 13; Lempert, supra note 13; Zeisel, . And Then There
Were None": The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHL L REv. 710 (1971).
25. Gelfand and Solomon have also devised a "three parameter" model in which j±
is allowed to take on two values, ju, and / for the probability of a correct vote given
that defendant is guilty and for the probability of a correct vote given that defendant is




here." Where 0 really is high, acting on this surmise may lead to
fewer mistakes and thereby result in a larger value of IA. Finally, / it-
self seems likely to be a function of n and to depend as well on
whether the jury is required to achieve unanimity. Social-
psychological studies have shown that within a broad range of sizes,
larger groups perform better than smaller ones on tasks involving re-
call or insight. 26 Where a unanimous verdict is not essential, the con-
tributions of some jurors may be ignored, making the jury act as if n
were smaller. Of course, to the extent a jury proceeds to a first ballot
prior to any discussion among the jurors, the influence of n on A will
be mitigated, but since smaller juries may be more likely to discuss
matters informally before proceeding to a formal expression of opin-
ion, even the magnitude of this mitigating factor may be affected by
n2.
As shown in section A, however, Gelfand and Solomon estimate
0 and p by searching for the single value of 0 and the single value of
IL that jointly generate the function Ya,, that best fits the data of
Kalven and Zeisel on the first ballot votes of 225 unanimous, twelve-
member juries in Chicago and Brooklyn. Consequently, the probabil-
ities ya,, given by (9) should be considered speculative, especially
when the jury size n differs from twelve.
The transition probabilities Pcl,, that are used to calculate the
likelihood that the jury as a whole will err rest on equally trouble-
some premises. These probabilities may be more stable across the
spectrum of defendants and cases, but they too seem connected with
the size and unanimity requirement of a jury. To account for size ef-
fects, Gelfand and Solomon rely on a "proportionality hypothesis" un-
der which two out of six first ballots for acquittal produce the same
likelihood of a final verdict of conviction as do 2i out of twelve.2 7 Yet,
this assumption is almost surely false. It contradicts generally ac-
cepted social-psychological findings about the probability of a group
26. Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371 (1963).
27. See text accompanying note 19 supra. In Kaye, supra note 13, at 1031 n.105, I
characterized this view as a resurrection of the proportionality thesis advanced in
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-01 n.49 (1970). This characterization was im-
precise and unfortunate. The Williams Court thought that regardless of jury size, "jurors
in the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of
the majority aligned against them." Id. This type of proportionality implies that the tran-
sition probabilities for two different size juries are proportional, as Gelfand and Solo-
mon assume. The difference is that it also fixes the values for these transition probabili-
ties uniquely and unrealistically. Gelfand and Solomon reject this facet of the Williams
Court's claim of proportionality.
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of i dissenters' conforming to a position held by a majority of n-i
group members.2 8 Since neither the calculated values of y. nor
those of Pcln,i can be accepted with much confidence, the conclusions
about the error rates for various jury sizes and voting protocols must
be viewed with some healthy skepticism.
H. ERRORS IN =F ESTIMATION AND PREDICTIONS OF MEANS
The previous section challenged several of the assumptions built
into the Poisson model as employed by Gelfand and Solomon. Never-
theless, since these researchers do not use equations (9) and (11) to
make predictions for specific cases, it might be argued that these as-
sumptions are not as serious as I have implied. For example, al-
though I have stated that the model assumes that 1z does not vary
from one juror to another, it is open to Gelfand and Solomon to re-
spond that the correct value for each juror can be conceived of as an
independent observation from a common distribution with mean p29
More generally, perhaps all the "constants" can be viewed as the
means of random variables, and (9) and (11) can be understood as
predicting mean probabilities of conviction, etc.30
Such a rejoinder would be false for at least two reasons. First, (9)
is nonlinear in 0 and tL In general, for a nonlinear function g of m
random variables Xj,
E.[g(Xb ....,X.)] i-- g[E.(X,1),...,E(X.)]
More specifically, let us write an equation for yn,i that expresses the
interdependence of 0, /1 and n more clearly than (9) and (11). If we
assume that the feedback effects between 0 and n and between 0 and
,u eventually result in stable equilibrium values 0 and P, and if we
explicitly note the dependence of 0 and p. on n, we obtain,
Yn., = ()[ An-"(1-A., + (10) 1 ' ] (13)
To account for the variation of in from case to case and defendant to
defendant, we now regard jn as a random variable. Likewise, to rec-
ognize the variation of P,, from case to case and from juror to juror,
28. Lempert, supra note 13, at 678-79.
29. See A Study of Poisson's Models, supra note 7; Considerations in Building Jury
Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 300.
30. See Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 300 ("If
each juror is conceived as being chosen randomly from the population of possible jurors
then the average or mean value of this characteristic is appropriate to use in describing
mean or average performance for a jury scheme.").
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we can view p, as another random variable. Denoting the joint prob-
ability density of these variables byf(., On,), the expected value of ,,.i
is given by
E(ynj)= [ O/i-)' + (14)
(1 - On)[A'n 1- A.)n" ]f(6.,,A.)d j.d,4n
E(y,) given by equation (14) does not generally equal y.,, found from
(13). Depending on the nature off, the magnitude of the discrepancy
can be substantial. 31
The second difficulty with viewing Gelfand and Solomon's devel-
opment of the Poisson model as a correct procedure for calculating
expectation values occurs when the values of On and pn found from
data for juries of size n are used to make predictions for juries com-
posed of some other number n' of jurors. These predictions are, of
course, of great interest to the legal community, but as the notation
of equation (13) emphasizes, it is not clear that 0n=0n, or that
Atn=Ant,. In addition, as discussed in section C of part I, the transition
probabilities needed to arrive at Pc and the like also seem to depend
on n.
The magnitude of the errors resulting from these matters could
best be appreciated by testing the predictions of the Poisson model
against empirical conviction rates and ballot distributions for the six-
member juries used in some states. In the absence of such data, we
are left with an unvalidated model of jury decisionmaking. By the
same token, its predictions cannot be disproved at present, but the
number of doubtful assumptions built into it gives us little reason to
be cpnfident in the predictions thus far developed. 32
31. Gelfand and Solomon argue that this difference will be negligible if jurors are
selected at random from a sufficiently homogeneous population (and, by implication, If
defendants and criminal cases are also homogeneous). Considerations in Building Jury
Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 300. They offer no reason beyond mathematical con-
venience for making this assumption of homogeneity. Of course, the observation that
Gelfand and Solomon may not be able to estimate accurately the mean probabilities as-
sociated with various size juries and voting protocols does not establish that the proba-
bilities deduced from the Poisson model are meaningless. For example, Y7., does repre-
sent the probability that i out of n identical, "average" jurors voting independently will
vote to acquit on the first ballot Although not the "average" probability for juries of
size n, y,,i is a probability for a perfectly homogeneous, "average" jury.
32. But see note 33 infra.
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III. FROM MATHEMATICS TO POLICY
In the end, it may be that the present form of the model is the
best we can hope for. And, if some assumptions-even heroic ones
-must be made, is it not better to make them and to generate some
results than to leave the resolution of the legal issues to which these
results pertain solely to judicial hunch? The short answer is that, as
long as the model's predictions are suitably qualified and explained,
they may appropriately serve a function in judicial decisionmaking.1
But lawyers distrust predictions derived from mathematical mod-
els, even when the results are plainly relevant to legal issues, partly
because they are like other human beings-they fear the unfamiliar.
Furthermore, they worry that judges, not being schooled in such
modes of thought, may place more reliance on superficially impress-
ive statistical demonstrations than can be justified by more careful
analysis. As Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ballew v. Georgia34 unfor-
tunately demonstrates, this latter concern is not entirely without
foundation. 35 Indeed, even an accurate model of size effects on jury
verdicts and error rates can be seriously misleading. Suppose, for in-
stance, that such a model "proved" that smaller juries do not differ
substantially from larger ones, or even that smaller juries can be ex-
pected to minimize a weighted sum or erroneous verdicts, as some
researchers have claimed. 36 If these results are restricted to the "av-
erage jury" or the "average defendant" or the "average case"-m
short, if they are stated in terms of expected values which collapse
33. One method of presentation that can prove helpful when controversial assump-
tions about the values of parameters or variables are necessary is to display the results
for a broad range of possible values. For instance, I have criticized the Poisson model
partly on the ground thit distinct values of 0 and g apply to different defendants. If,
however, the model's output does not change substantially as 0 and Ai are varied, the
force of this criticism is blunted. Thus, Gelfand remarks:
Our greatest frustration is the lack of real data. There is considerable external
data-conviction rates, etc., over various types of cases and jury schemes, but
the only internal data [on preliminary balloting] is that of Kalven and Zeisel,
and it is 20 years old. One fortunate aspect is the fact that the direction of our
inferences is fairly insensitive .. . . [O]ver a broad range of social decision
schemes [transition probabilities] and of 0, ju, [and] p values [used in the
"three parameter" model], it is still the case that the six member jury will make
more errors of each type than its twelve member counterpart.
Letter from Alan Gelfand to David Kaye, Nov. 17, 1980.
34. 435 U.S. 223 (1968).
35. See Kaye, supra note 13.
36. Nagel & Neef, supra note 22.
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several dimensions of distinct legal interest into scalar quanti-
ties-they can seduce policymakers into ignoring crucial matters.
For instance, finding that the expected number of false convictions
and false acquittals are the same for twelve-member and six-member
juries might lead a judge to think that a six-person jury is as good as
the traditional twelve-member one. But if it is not also shown that
the six-member jury makes no more errors when confronted with dif-
ferent categories of cases, the judge's first thought should be dis-
missed. If six-member juries are more likely to err when confronted
with, say, a group of politically unpopular defendants in a "political
trial," or a large corporate defendant in a personal injury action, they
should not be upheld as constitutional even if their mean error rate
(averaged across all types of defendants) is identical to that for twelve-
member juries.
It is hard to avoid such mistakes in translating research work into
policy conclusions. In fact, Gelfand and Solomon unwittingly may in-
vite this type of mistake in reporting that twelve- and six-person ju-
ries can hardly be distinguished on the basis of their expected convic-
tion rate Pc,37 and that this finding "reinforces the judicial decision
that there is essentially no difference in the prospects for conviction
of an accused before a six-man vs. a twelve-man jury."38 Even if the
mathematical result is trustworthy, such a conclusion tempts a
policymaker to forget that this is a mean figure and that important
differences might be revealed by a more fine-grained analysis. More-
over, the differences Gelfand and Solomon describe in their earlier
work as "negligible" include, for several values of 0 and 14 as many
as 42 convictions per 1000 jury trials. While such a number is small
in relation to Pc itself, convicting, in the long run, an additional forty-
two persons out of every thousand is not "negligible" for legal pur-
poses. 39
In presenting these thoughts, I do not wish to be understood as
37. E.g., Considerations in Building Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 308
(rates of conviction for six- and twelve-member juries are "approximately the same").
Gelfand and Solomon do find the different sized juries distinguishable on the basis of
differences in Pc1G, Pcid and similar quantities. E.g., Rejoinder, supra note 7.
38. Modeling Jury Verdicts, supra note 7, at 36.
39. Similar observations have been made with regard to the confusion created by the
different statistical and legal meanings of the word "significant." Lempert, supra note
13. In their most recent paper Gelfand and Solomon recognize that "if we compare a
characteristic such as the rate of conviction over two schemes, [tihough the percentage
differences may be small the absolute number may not be so." Considerations in Build-
ing Jury Behavior Models, supra note 7, at 296.
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arguing that legal policy should never be tainted by statistical model-
ing. To the contrary, I believe that the jury size question is an appro-
priate one for statistical analysis, that the model explicated by
Gelfand and Solomon is intriguing, and that Gelfand and Solomon are
unusually sensitive to some of the problems of model-building in this
area and to the need for fiurther research. My thesis, then, consists of
two points. First, I believe that there are still major problems to be
solved-perhaps in the collection of data and perhaps in further re-
finements of the Poisson model--before its predictioris can be relied
on with confidence in setting legal policy. Second, I hope that my ob-
servations will help create a better understanding of the obstacles to
drawing policy conclusions from research efforts, and make for a more
fi-uifful and constructive dialogue between the disciplines of law and
statistics.

